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STAR WoRMwoon. By Curtis Bok. 1 New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1959.
Pp. vii, 228. $3.95.

Punishing criminals is a social activity which has enjoyed almost universal popularity. Perhaps this is because the deviation of the wrongdoer is an affront to the law-abiding citizen, or perhaps it is because
many of us find relief from our cares in the knowledge that others, less
upright than ourselves, suffer greater woes. Regardless of the cause,
however, there is considerable embarrassment in the popular appeal of
the practice -we blush to enjoy the suffering of others. We therefore
follow the course usually taken by men doing something of which they
are ashamed: we invent a duty which requires it.
The duty most often stated to justify indulgence of the impulse to
punish is that of preventing chaos: if we do not punish the criminal, his
victim will, and feuding results. Justice Bok here joins the protest
against this institutionalized vengeance as a purpose of the criminal law.
He has taken an easy case to argue, for public vengeance has little left to
commend it. It may have been useful to primitive societies. But primitive punishments were swift, public, and painful, and they were most
often administered by the victim or those immediately offended by forbidden conduct. Such vengeance ventilated the passions of the victim,
expending unwanted bile. We are too genteel to inflict punishment with
the speed and vigor needed to serve such a purpose. And our punishments are imposed behind a veil of prison walls by delegates who learn
to asphyxiate their sensitivity to suffering; hence our revenge is not
tempered by the compassion which was sometimes a saving grace of
primitive punishment. 2 As Justice Bok makes clear, vengeance is futile
and an obstruction to any sensible approach to criminal law.
Another reviewer of this book has questioned this conclusion. 3 He
observes that most opponents of capital punishment favor an exception
for Nazi war criminals and that even Justice Bok may sometimes feel
the urge for vengeance. This observation is imbued with a classic irrelevance. ("Would you want your sister to marry one?") The same reviewer also observes that hell is no longer a fashionable belief, and that,
if there is to be no divine vengeance, there must be a greater demand for
earthly vengeance. An important cause, however, of the declining prestige of hell has been the recognition of the cruel absurdity of divine
vengeance against a wrongdoer whose conduct must surely have been
within the control of any divine power which would inflict the immortal
punishment. This recognition of the external causes of wrongdoing is as
much at war with a thirst for mortal vengeance as it is with the idea of
hell. The current low fashion of hell seems evidence of less, not more,
demand for public revenge.
1

justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

2The Cheyenne tradition of vengeance was especially enlightened: The brave

who cheated on the communal buffalo hunt was promptly beaten severely by the
soldiers in charge of the hunt. His horse was killed and his goods destroyed. It
was then the practice to forgive- the soldiers gave him a new horse and helped
him reestablish his household as a fully rehabilitated member of the group. See
LLEwELLYx & HOEBEL, THE C:Iva'NNFmx WAY chs. 4-7 (1941).
3 Bishop, Book Review, 69 YA1.s LJ. 193, a96-97 (1959).
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Despite the strength of his position, however, Justice Bok's polemics
are not as effective as they might have been. It is not as clear as it should
be that Justice Bok is protesting vengeful punishment and not necessarily
all punishment. The case for punishment does not rest entirely on vengeance; it is often ennobled by the avowed end of protecting society from
crime. One may sometimes doubt the candor of this avowal of purpose.
Is it fear of criminals -thataccounts for the intensity of feeling of those
who advocate stern, deterrent measures? It seems unlikely; most people
share this reviewer's optimism that crime and auto accidents happen
only to others. And if we are really so interested in deterrence, why do
we not make the effort necessary to detect and apprehend more criminals? We seem content to leave our law-enforcement establishment so
ill-equipped and undermanned that the chances of punishment are nearly
always a good gamble for the criminal. But even if deterrence is not
always the most genuine motive for punishment, it cannot be discounted.
It is probable that some criminals may be deterred by the possibility of
punishment. Because this hard fact gives trouble to modern theorists,
and especially to the absolutists among them, deterrence has become the
rallying flag of the hardheads in their combat against against these softheads. Justice Bok does not deal fully nor directly with the possible deterrent value of criminal punishment; his view seems to be that deterrent
punishment may be useful so long as it is tailored to the particular criminal and not employed as a disguise for public vengeance. 4 (p. 218)
But the expression of this view comes too late to prevent the hostile
reader from convicting the author, as Professor Bishop did,5 of blindness
to the possible virtues of deterrent punishment. Earlier and more complete homage might have disarmed a number of critics, who are now
otherwise free to dismiss Justice Bok as a softhead.
The basic argument of the book is also weakened by frequent digressions expressing the author's views on such related problems as the indeterminate sentence, the reliability of confessions, and insanity as a
defense. These views are often sound and always provocative, and I do
not regret their presence. It is, however, unfortunate that Justice Bok
expressed his ideas as a single fabric without a seam - everything seems
to follow from his general approach, whereas in fact many of his ideas
are quite independent of his protest against vengeful punishment. The
reader who does not discern this for himself is left to accept or reject the
book as a package. And some of the collateral thoughts are quite exposed to rejection.
4 On page r48 he asserts that "the protection of society as a single objective is
better than the porridge of punishment, correction, rehabilitation, and social protection which we now serve up in the same dish." This leaves undefined the role of
punishment, as a method, in serving -that single objective, and greatly confuses the
issue by using the word punishment to describe the objective of revenge. This
careless use of the term is unhappily repeated elsewhere. Obviously, revenge requires
punishment, but punishment might logically serve other purposes. The two terms
cannot properly be treated as synonyms. Justice Bok seems to recognize this on
page i5o when he says, "I am careful not to say let us abolish punishment, for the
word has the root sense of penitence, but let us abolish a criminal system of laws
and sanctions based on vengeance." But see Bishop, supra note 3, at 196 n.23.
IId. at 198-99.
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For example, Justice Bok expresses his view that we must ultimately
recognize the inadequacy of the adversary jury trial as a device for determining sanity. " [T]he proper place of psychiatry in the law," he asserts, "is not in Court but in the prisons." (p. 1i) We should abandon mens rea and return to a mechanical law of crimes which imposes on the judicial process only the task of determining deeds, and
leave to the behavioral scientists the determination of the appropriate
consequences to be suffered by the wrongdoer. This is an advanced
opinion which I do not share and which will be challenged by many
readers. It must be granted that the problem of communicating science
to juries is difficult and perhaps insuperable. 6 It is apparently impossible
to fit intelligent medical testimony to the dogma of M'Naghten's Rule,
even though that definition of insanity is perfectly comprehensible to
most laymen. It is perhaps equally impossible for reasonable jurors to
relate the Durham Rule, which is comprehensible to the psychiatrist, to
their experience and judgment. This is a dilemma for which Justice Bok
offers a solution. But there is ample room for doubt that this would be an
improvement. It is implicit in the very existence of the criminal statute
that a judgment of criminality will carry moral stigma even though the
"treatment" is a stay at "The Homestead at Hot Springs, with golf,
tennis, and psychiatry . . . . 7 Fairness therefore requires that no one
should be adjudged a criminal who is not morally responsible for his act.
Indeed, for this reason, it would probably be an unconstitutional departure from the requirements of due process to abolish the defense of
insanity.8 It is clear that a legislature may not retain the defense and
delegate jurisdiction over it to an administrative process, for this would
plainly deprive the defendant of his right to jury trial. And even if this
were constitutional, many would regard it as unwise to submit such a
question of basic human right to the decision of specialists. The wiser
solution would permit both the jury and the state psychiatrist to pass
upon the question of the defendant's responsibility, with the defendant
benefiting from a favorable decision by either. This is the effect of practices prevailing in many states at the present time. One may approve
this solution without rejecting Justice Bok's principal contention. The
basic protest would therefore have gained strength if the independence
of the two ideas had been made more clear.
Despite these collateral weaknesses, Justice Bok is amply persuasive
that vengeance is a luxury that even an affluent society should forego.
His argument, standing alone, however, is not likely to have more effect
than like essays which have appeared during recent centuries. The idea
has heretofore failed of acceptance not for want of an effective spokesman, but because the opposing spirit of vengeance is immune to blandishments of reason.
I Itshould be noted that the problem is much broader than the question of insanity. Many types of cases require the jury to consider technical evidence which is
beyond the real comprehension of ordinary laymen.

Bishop, supra note 3, at ,gg.

8

See Sinclair v. State, x61 Miss.

14-2, 132

So. 5S1

(1931) ; State
127 Md.

Wash. io6, iio Pac. 1020 (igio); accord, Deems v. State,
(1916); cf. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (957).

v. Strasburg, 6o
624, 96 AtI. 878
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Justice Bok has, however, made an artful effort to overcome this obstacle to understanding with a very good piece of fiction which provides
points of departure for his essays. It is the fiction which makes this a
good book, for it confronts the vengeance motive along its most vulnerable dimension. Justice Bok tells us a tale of the crime, trial, and execution of an adolescent boy who was charged with raping and murdering a thirteen-year-old girl, and eating her forearm. The story is told
with a compassion which will place many readers on -theseat of judgment
with the unfortunate defendant. The result is that those who are not
masochists must lose their thirst for vengeance despite their revulsion for
the defendant's crime. The antibody which affords the immunity to reason is thus destroyed.
With vision thus cleared, the righteous reader can see what he has perhaps not seen before: that we cannot understand criminal conduct, or
appraise methods to prevent it, simply by introspective examination of
the law-abiding citizen's reactions to temptation. Understanding requires that we project ourselves not only into the immediate situation of
the criminal act, 'but also into the experience and environment of each
accused. This is the basic premise of modem penology and of Justice
Bok's argument. It is a difficult idea to house in the same shelter with
a feeling for public vengeance.
This lesson has a value, if not an urgency, which can be most clearly
seen in the growing need for a solution to the narcotics problem. There
is considerable evidence that the problem has 'been most directly caused
not by the social conditions which nurture addiction, but by the vengeful policies of our lawmakers and administrators Narcotics addiction
has never been a serious problem in other Western nations, and it was
not a problem in this country until we embarked upon a campaign of
punishment of addicts and the storekeepers and doctors who supplied
them. 10 This drove the whole operation of addiction and supply underground where it has since festered and grown to be a grave social cancer.
The addict was forced into a life of crime in order to secure his supply;
he became the victim of the professional peddler, who, with the incentive
of huge black-market prices, has engaged himself in a successful effort
to expand his market. He has been assisted in this endeavor by the fact
that narcotics have now become the forbidden fruit, greatly attractive
to rebellious adolescents. The rebel who thus expresses his rebellion is
thenceforth enmeshed in the affairs, of the underworld. The narcotics
trade is therefore a powerful sustinent of the underworld, assuring it a
ready supply of cash and manpower. The reaction of our lawmakers and
administrators to this situation has been puritanical and exceedingly
foolish. They have chosen to increase the penalties for violation of
9
For an excellent discussion, see King, Narcotic Drug Laws and Enforcement
Policies, 22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. a13 (1957).
" The campaign dates from the Harrison Act, 38 Stat. 785 (1914), as amended,
26 U.S.C. §§ 47o-76 (1958). Congress apparently did not intend to initiate such
a campaign; it seems to have come about through operation of Parkinson's Law
on the Narcotics Bureau. For the curious history of the act, see King, supra note
9, at 116-24.
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narcotics laws," thus demonstrating their firm opposition to sin, and
thus also aggravating the problem. The present spiralling trend might
support the prediction that we will soon impose capital punishment on
first offenders of the narcotics laws, and thereby become a nation of hopheads and mainliners.
The only escape from this spiral seems to be a general recognition of
the truths which Justice Bok espouses. The solution to the narcotics
problem cannot be found in greater punishment, but only in greater
understanding of the individual offender and his personal difficulties. As
applied to narcotics addiction, the proof of Justice Bok's assertions can
be found in the experience of other countries.' 2 With respect to other
problems of criminal conduct, the consequences of an appreciation of the
futility of vengeance are open to conjecture. It is, however, as Justice
Bok demonstrates, a promising possibility.
PAUL D. CARMNUGTON *

BOOK NOTE
GuIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING. By Ren6 A. Wormser.1
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1958. PP. xi, 175. $4.95.
To today's lawyer, the term "estate planning" usually evokes immediate mental images of tax-code sections, complex trust instruments,
and the like. Mr. Wormser's latest book will provide relief from this
occupational disability; if the harried practitioner does not find the solution to all his problems within the 1i6 pages of Wormser's Guide to
Estate Planning, at least he will benefit from the author's adroit portrayal of the broad objectives toward which any successful estate plan
must aim. And, indeed, no valid criticism can be made of Mr. Wormser's
superficial treatment of this difficult subject matter; his avowed purpose is not to tell "the reader how to get to various ends," but rather to
help "the reader to decide where he wants to go." (p. v)
Thus, the absence of technical material should not dissuade the profession from regarding this work with interest. Too often estate plans,
however perfect their draftsmanship, fail in their consideration of the
testator's individual needs. This is not always the fault of the lawyer;
rather the blame is often to be laid upon the client's lack of comprehensive thought as to what his desires are. Mr. Wormser's folksy approach to these problems emphasizes that the tail of tax advantages
should not wag the dog of the client's personal requirements. For
example, infant accumulation trusts under section 2503 (c) are frowned
upon despite the favorable gift-tax consequences involved, since their
WOIuMSER's

" See 65 Stat. 767 (1951), 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1958).
12 See, e.g., Lindesmith, The British System of Narcotics Control, 22 LAW &
CONTEM1P. PROB. 138 (1957).

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wyoming.
'Member of the New York Bar.

